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ABSTRACT (142): This article explores an alternative to the established dichotomy 
between philosophical (natural law) accounts of human rights, characterised by a 
foundationalist tendency, and political (practice-based) accounts of human rights, 
which aspire to be non-foundationalist. I will argue that in order to justify human 
rights practice, political accounts of human rights cannot do without the support of 
theoretical foundations, although not necessarily of the natural law variety. 
As an alternative to natural law metaphysics, a deflationary theory of human rights, 
based on a deflationary account of truth, will be put forward. Starting from a 
distinction between ‘extreme’ and ‘moderate’ forms of deflationism, this article will 
defend a constructivist theory of human rights grounded on the Humean notion of 
conventionalism. This innovative approach to human rights can provide political 
conceptions of human rights with the foundations (or quasi-foundations) they need, 
but are currently lacking. 
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The only consensus about human rights is that there is no consensus on the nature and 
justification of human rights. Some argue that human rights are essentially moral 
rights, since the idea of human rights denotes a moral concept. Others argue that 
human rights is a political concept, therefore human rights are primarily legal or 
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political rights. This underlying rift in theories of human rights is the reason why the 
literature on this idea is currently divided between those who defend a traditional, 
ethically driven vision of human rights, which is practice-independent (Gewirth 1982; 
Griffin 2008; Tasioulas 2009; Buchanan 2010), and those who reject it in favour of a 
political approach, allegedly free from metaphysics, where human rights are strictly 
practice-dependent (Rawls 1999; Beitz 2009; Raz 2010). 
 The aim of this article is to find a synthesis between these two dialectically 
opposed positions. I will argue that the received view of a dichotomy between 
political and metaphysical conceptions of human rights is to some degree misleading, 
and potentially detrimental to the idea and aspirations of a human rights agenda, 
therefore it should be resisted. Notwithstanding their best efforts, political conceptions 
of human rights are not immune from metaphysical considerations, and in some cases 
even draw on natural law arguments whenever questions of a justificatory nature 
arise. More specifically, I will put forward and defend a different metaphysical 
approach to the theoretical foundations of human rights, one that is ideally suited to 
political conceptions of human rights. This approach explores the relationship 
between ‘human rights’ and ‘truth’. 
 Part I will compare and contrast the political and metaphysical accounts of 
human rights; while natural law provides the wrong type of foundations for human 
rights, the political approach cannot do without foundations. Part II will argue that a 
robust conception of truth lurks behind natural law accounts of human rights, which 
suggests that an alternative way to theorise the foundation of human rights is by 
starting from a different conception of truth, to be precise a deflationary theory of 
truth. Part III will distinguish between an extreme and a moderate interpretation of 
deflationism about truth, recommending moderate deflationism as an attractive 
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proposition for theories of human rights seeking an alternative to the natural law 
paradigm. Part IV will argue that by abandoning moral foundationalism the political 
theories of human rights of Charles Beitz and Joseph Raz struggle to give a 
justification for the practice of human rights, a problem that could be solved with the 
help of a moderate deflationary view about truth. Part V will put forward the 
backbone of a deflationary theory of human rights; this theory is constructivist but not 
Kantian, instead it appeals to David Hume’s conventionalism. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS: WITH OR WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS 
 
The tide is turning against traditional, metaphysical accounts of human rights. The 
sharp distinction between ‘political’ and ‘metaphysical’ justifications in political 
philosophy has a long history, although in recent years this division bares the mark of 
John Rawls (1985, p.223), who maintained that it is possible, indeed desirable, to 
promote a conception of justice as fairness without needing to refer to philosophical 
or metaphysical claims ‘to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and 
identity of persons’. While Rawls’ concerns were directed towards issues of social 
justice, since then his vision regarding the task of political philosophy has been 
adopted more widely, including matters regarding human rights. In the last analysis 
the disagreement between ‘political’ and ‘metaphysical’ theories of human rights rests 
on the question whether human rights necessitate a foundational basis or not. 
 There are many reasons why an account of human rights is said to need 
foundations, but two in particular stand out: for the sake of ‘deep understanding’ 
and/or ‘justification’. First, foundations provide us with what Jeremy Waldron (2015) 
calls ‘deep understanding’. Foundational inquiries help to deepen and enrich our 
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understanding of human rights. There are always going to be aspects of international 
human rights law that remain obscure, and ambivalent; when faced with uncertainty 
over the correct interpretation of human rights law the only way forward is by 
inspecting the philosophies that shaped the law in the first place. Secondly, 
foundations offer a justification for human rights in general, and human rights law in 
particular. Without foundations, human rights lack authority, or as Jerome Shestack 
(1998, p.202) says: ‘one furthers fidelity to human rights law by understanding the 
moral justifications that underlie that law’.1 
 Seeking foundations for human rights may be desirable, perhaps even 
necessary, but there is no guarantee that everyone will be convinced. The prevailing 
or orthodox type of philosophical foundations of human rights remains highly 
problematic, still being dominated by the logic of natural law theory. In particular, the 
natural law approach to human rights is vulnerable to three lines of attack: for lacking 
universality; for being overly conservative; and for lacking political expediency.  
 First, any reference to a basic moral concept or principle is inevitably going to 
have a narrow appeal, undermining the universal reach of human rights. This is in part 
why Rawls was sceptical of political theories grounded on a comprehensive moral 
doctrine: they will only convince those who already buy into the doctrine, but will not 
make any difference to those who don’t. Secondly, foundational theories can have 
conservative tendencies; this is certainly the case with natural law theories, 
particularly the non-secular interpretation within this tradition.2 Thirdly, foundational 
theories fail to bridge the gap between moral ideals and political reality; issuing 
recommendations that the global political order should be reformed so that it falls in 
line with certain philosophical views is, at best, a long term strategy, and at worse an 
intellectual pastime with no political impact of any substance. 
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 For all these reasons over the last few decades the political approach to human 
rights has gained momentum, at the detriment of the more traditional, philosophical 
approach. By focussing on human rights ‘practice’, and therefore distancing itself 
from the metaphysical quagmire that inevitably comes with foundational debates, the 
political approach to human rights claims the advantage of presenting an alternative to 
the ‘natural-law’ approach, while fulfilling a role in real-world politics. There are, 
however, some problems intrinsic to this political approach.  
First, the line between political and metaphysical conceptions of human rights 
is more blurry than often assumed. As Laura Valentini (2012, p.181) rightly points 
out, endorsing the ‘political view’ is no guarantee that we do so without metaphysics, 
since the political view of human rights still needs to engage in the sort of abstract 
moral reasoning that one associates with the natural-law approach: ‘the most plausible 
political approach to human rights is closer to natural-law theories than proponents of 
the political view typically acknowledge’. 
 Secondly, strictly political accounts of human rights can be more politically 
conservative than its advocates like to admit, and conservatism is precisely what we 
don’t want from a theory of human rights. Invoking the value of stability (as Rawls 
did) only legitimises the status quo. Making human rights contingent on the current 
system of international relations makes it possible to understand human rights as 
political notions, but once again as Valentini (2012, p.189) rightly points out, ‘at the 
cost of depriving them of much of their critical capacity’. 
 Thirdly, while political views attempt to replace metaphysics with pragmatic 
practice, no justification for the practice itself is given. Political theories of human 
rights seem to work on the assumption that the practice justifies itself, although this is 
logically and politically problematic, as I will argue in more detail in Part IV. There is 
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a lot that we can take from human rights practice, but we also need to have reasons for 
engaging in the practice, for keeping the practice going, and for participating in 
human rights activism, especially when operating in contexts where human rights are 
not welcomed. For these reasons perhaps human rights practice is not immune from 
foundational issues.3   
 In what follows I will put forward a solution to this impasse facing human 
right theory, with political and metaphysical accounts pulling in opposite directions. 
While the limits of natural law theories of human rights are incontestable, raising 
serious questions for the traditional metaphysical approach, the alternative ‘political’ 
approach is not always convincing, since contrary to what its advocates suggest even 
a practice-based approach to human rights may not succeed in divesting itself from 
questions of a foundational nature. The solution is to show that there is scope for 
metaphysics in human rights theory, although it doesn’t have to be of the natural law 
variety. The alternative to natural law theory is not to give up on metaphysics tout 
court, as political accounts of human rights encourage us to do, but to look for a 
different type of metaphysics. In other words what is needed is not a metaphysical 
theory imbued in ethical or metaethical principles and concept, but one that asks a 
different set of questions, namely: if we truly believe in human rights, and we believe 
that human rights truly exist (especially when confronted with situations where there 
is no legislation to enforce human rights), what is the nature of the truth behind our 
convictions regarding human rights? What can theories of truth tell us about human 
rights? 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF TRUTH 
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For a long time there was an assumption, immortalized in the American Declaration 
of Independence of 1776, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, that the validity of human 
rights is a self-evident truth: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; 
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’.4 Contemporary 
philosophers are understandably ill-at-ease with promoting a justification of human 
rights based on claims of ‘self-evidence’, for obvious reasons; and yet there is still a 
widespread belief that the notion of human rights encapsulates a fundamental truth, or 
that truth is on the side of human rights. 
Since its philosophical conception many centuries before the formal 
endorsement it received in 1948, the concept of human rights has been subject to an 
ambitious metaphysical project, with the aim of uncovering the timeless, universal 
nature of human rights, and in particular the belief that a ‘human right’ is a 
substantive property, waiting to be discovered.5 Natural law theory has been, and to 
some extents still is, the dominant philosophical approach to human rights. At the 
core of natural-law theory is a certain normative view about our status as human 
beings reflecting an objective truth. 
The relationship between human rights, natural rights, and truth is complex. 
There are two ways to interpret this affiliation. One approach is more crude and 
unsophisticated, betraying dogmatic natural law enthusiasm. It suggests that the 
concept of human rights is doomed to remain unintelligible unless the person is 
understood to exist in relation to an objective truth transcending humanity itself. This 
position, advocated by Janet Madigan (2007), predictably looks at Christianity and 
St.Thomas Aquinas for guidance. Madigan argues that truth should have priority over 
individual happiness, even personal freedom, in fact according to Madigan (2007, 
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p.165) ‘a natural law defense of human rights necessarily begins with the protection 
of life itself’. Madigan appeals to this truth not only to reject claims of a human right 
to abortion, but also to lament the fact that in modern human rights discourse life 
itself is now thought to be at the service of personal freedom, when instead life should 
be law’s chief occupation. 
A much more sophisticated analysis of the relationship between human rights, 
natural rights, and truth can be found in the work of James Griffin (2012, p.45), who 
argues that human rights should be grounded on a theory of personhood, in particular 
normative agency, which he defines as ‘our capacity to choose and to pursue our 
conception of a worthwhile life’. What often goes unnoticed, but ought to be exposed, 
is the fact that behind philosophical theories of human nature a robust theory of truth 
is forever lurking. Griffin’s theory of human rights as normative agency is a case in 
point.  
A key step in his elaborate metaphysical argument is that as normative agents 
we have non-biological human interest. These include what Griffin calls 
‘accomplishments’, which we are told are not merely subjective but have an objective 
nature. Accomplishments are what gives life meaning, in fact Griffin (2008, p.118) 
explains that accomplishments are not merely those things that give us a 
psychological feeling of fulfilment, instead ‘it is a matter of life’s not being empty or 
futile or wasted’. Griffin (2008, p.114) justifies the objectivity of our basic interest in 
being accomplished as follows: ‘For me to see anything as enhancing my life, I must 
see it as enhancing life in a generally intelligible way, in a way that pertains to human 
life and not just to my particular life’. He returns on this idea in the next paragraph: 
‘to see anything as making life better, we must see it as an instance of something 
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generally intelligible as valuable and, furthermore, as valuable for any normal human 
being’ (Griffin 2008, p.115). 
It is in order to justify the claim that there are things in our life that are 
‘objectionably valuable’ that Griffin introduces the concept of truth.6 Griffin (2008, 
p.121) starts from the assumption that we possess a sensitivity to certain values, and 
we recognize a value ‘by recognizing certain things that characteristically go on in 
human life’. In other words, we reflect on key shared elements of the human 
experience, and we converge on certain beliefs. What makes something ‘objectively 
valuable’ for Griffin is related to a certain view about natural facts and especially the 
metaphysics of truth. As Griffin (2008, p.122) explains, we may regard statements 
about human interests as statements of natural fact, which enjoy a truth-value: ‘nature 
consists of objects, properties, and events that are independent of our ideas and beliefs 
about them … And we confirm our beliefs against nature – that is the truistic version 
of the correspondence theory of truth. We look more closely; we collect evidence; we 
find counter-examples. These are the ordinary ways in which we establish the truth of 
a claim’.  
This passage is crucial, as it vindicates a possible reading of Griffin’s general 
theory of human rights, one revealing a strong affinity between the natural-law 
approach to human rights and a certain (robust) metaphysical theory of truth. 
Metaphysically speaking, if you scratch a theory of human rights you will expose a 
theory of truth.7  Robust theorists of human rights are characterized by two basic 
assumptions: first, that belief in human rights is similar to belief in truth, and 
secondly, that the truth in question has objective, factual properties.  
One of the most distinctive features of Griffin’s (2008, pp.36-37) work is his 
attempt to argue that what is evaluative can also be objective and factual: ‘It is, 
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though, much too quick to think that what is evaluative cannot also be objective. It is 
too quick to think that it cannot also be natural….But if this expansive naturalism is, 
as I think, borne out, it gives hope of restoring a form of that central feature of the 
human rights tradition: namely, that these rights are grounded in natural facts about 
human beings’; yet Griffin never explains what he means by a ‘fact’, nor what makes 
a fact ‘natural’.8  
The fundamental problem with robust theories of truth is that truth cannot 
perform the required and desired function. To claim that a certain assertion ‘is true’ 
adds nothing to the initial assertion, which suggests that perhaps truth is overrated, 
and possibly even redundant. Similarly there is nothing behind a claim about human 
rights that makes it true. Just as it is problematic to assume that truth is an essential 
property, defined by an underlying nature, so human rights are also not a genuine 
property. It follows that the ‘robust’ way of thinking about human rights may be 
intrinsically flawed, and should be reconsidered.  
Although most philosophical inquiries on human rights almost inevitably start 
by asking the preliminary question ‘What is the nature of human rights?’, this may be 
the wrong question to ask, for this question is based on the premise that human rights 
have a nature, and our job is to discover what that is. We need to consider the 
possibility that perhaps there is no underlying nature to rights waiting to be unearthed, 
since rights may not be a property that is bestowed on human beings.9 Abandoning 
that assumption as the starting point of a different philosophical reflection on human 
rights can be both illuminating and liberating. 
 This article defends a theory of human rights grounded on a different 
conception of truth: not the robust truth we find in naturalistic approaches to human 
rights, but a deflationary truth. Instead of searching for foundations of human rights in 
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accounts of human nature, I suggest we look elsewhere, at our understanding of what 
type of truth stands behind the presumed validity of human rights. The reason for 
looking at notions of truth rather than human nature is that it may suggest an 
alternative to the kind of metaphysics that ‘political’ accounts of human nature 
reluctantly are forced to accept: a metaphysics of the natural law variety. If this is 
successful, we will have the advantage of securing political conceptions of human 
rights on metaphysical foundations, without endorsing justifications that are 
potentially divisive (not everyone will agree on a certain view of human nature), or 
speculative (the assumption that natural rights exist independently of positive law, 
that they are ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered).  
 
TWO TYPES OF DEFLATIONISM 
 
What applies to truth also applies to human rights – if the alternative to a robust 
theory of truth is a deflationary theory of truth, it stands to reason that the alternative 
to a robust theory of human rights is a deflationary theory of human rights. The term 
‘deflationism’ is to be understood as a generic drift or trend rather than a precise 
position, or as Crispin Wright (1999, p.209) says: ‘deflationism is more of a 
‘tendency’ than a definite philosophical position, and different deflationists display 
differences of formulation and emphasis which make it hard to see what may be 
essential and what optional in this view’. With this in mind, we can start with a 
generic account of deflationism before distinguishing between two positions: extreme 
deflationism and moderate deflationism.  
 Deflationism stands for the general propensity to reverse the tendency 
whereby a concept becomes over-inflated, in the sense that it is required to do more 
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than it can reasonably be expected. Inflating the notion of truth gives truth a 
substantive view, when instead it stands for nothing more than a truism. To deflate is 
also to demystify, to the extent that what appeared at first as a great metaphysical 
puzzle is now dismissed as a non-problem that should not concern us. Regarding 
truth, deflationism suggests that we should not bother with questions concerning the 
nature of truth (notwithstanding the fact that this has been a central question for 
philosophers over many centuries), since the property of truth has no underlying 
nature. 
 Apart from truth, one can also have a deflationary attitude towards human 
rights. Human rights cannot be justified on ontological grounds, they are not a 
property, or at least not an essential property: there is no ‘underlying essence’ of 
human rights waiting to be discovered or revealed by philosophical analysis. The 
deflationary conception of human rights fundamentally opposes Alan Gewirth’s 
(1984, p.4) claims that ‘the existence of human rights depends on the existence of 
certain moral justificatory reasons ….. [which are] something that is discovered rather 
than invented. The failure of this or that attempt at discovery does not, of itself, entail 
that there is nothing there to be discovered’. Contra Gewirth, deflationism states that 
human rights are constructed, or invented, not discovered. I will return to 
constructivism about human rights in Part V below. 
 Deflationism is a broad church. It is possible to distinguish between two types 
of deflationism, one more extreme and the other more moderate. The more familiar 
type of deflationism is also the most extreme, as championed by Paul Horwich (1990, 
p.2), who holds that truth is not ‘an ingredient of reality whose underlying essence 
will, it is hoped, one day be revealed by philosophical or scientific analysis’. Horwich 
(1999, p.239), explains his own brand of deflationism about truth in the following 
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terms: ‘The deflationary attitude about truth – and the particular variant of it that I call 
minimalism – is a reaction against the natural and widespread idea that the property of 
truth has some sort of underlying nature and that our problem as philosophers is to say 
what that nature is, to analyse truth either conceptually or substantively, to specify, at 
least roughly, the conditions necessary and sufficient for something to be true’. 
 Horwich’s deflationism is famously dismissive of truth, rejecting the 
substantive appeal of this notion, and limiting its property to a mere formal or logical 
quality. But this is not the only way to be deflationist about truth. If Horwich 
represents the more extreme form of deflationism, Mark Richard stands for a more 
moderate approach. According to Richard (2008, p.6), it is simply a question of being 
guilty of making inappropriate references to ‘truth’ when it is not required or 
necessary, being the wrong dimension of evaluation for our claims, arguments, or 
evidence: ‘As I see it, we – mistakenly or simply out of convenience – use ‘true’ in 
cases in which we shouldn’t; we act as if there is a single dimension of evaluation for 
all our discourse when, in fact, there is not’. 
Richard’s deflationism denotes a simple but powerful idea: relying on truth 
has made us intellectually lazy, since we end up appealing to this notion in every 
occurrence, even when it is not called for. We deflate truth simply by acknowledging 
that it is not the only meter we should use to measure things, which does not take 
away from its importance in any way. Although Richard does not make any reference 
to human rights in his work, his interpretation of deflationism could be applied to 
human rights, indeed it may help us rethink the project of what it means to ground 
human rights on metaphysical foundations. What we can take from Richard’s account 
of truth is that truth is not the only game in town. There are many contexts where truth 
and falsity are not the appropriate dimensions of evaluation; the discourse of human 
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right is one of those contexts where truth does not apply. We can give more or less 
good arguments on human rights, offer more or less conclusive evidence, express our 
thoughts and feelings, and have genuine disagreements, without any of this having 
anything to do with evaluations of truth or falsity. In the last analysis there is a great 
deal we can say about human rights, and its justification, without appealing to 
metaphysically robust claims about truth. 
 Deflationism about human rights fundamentally disagrees with Jefferson’s 
famous claim that human rights are a self-evident truth, since the idea of human rights 
has nothing to do with truth, self-evident or otherwise. Similarly, deflationism about 
human rights disagrees with Griffin’s appeal to the correspondence theory of truth in 
order to justify his claim that statements about human interests are statements of 
natural fact, which enjoy a truth-value. Contra Jefferson and Griffin (and many 
others), to be deflationist about human rights is to believe that human rights are 
artificial constructs, or to be more precise a convention that fosters social cooperation. 
Truth is not on the side of human rights, nor against human rights. The closest we 
come to truth starting from this deflationary idea is along the lines of Simon 
Blackburn’s (1993, p.15) quasi-realism: ‘a quasi-realist is a person who, starting from 
a recognizably anti-realist-position, finds himself progressively able to mimic the 
intellectual practices supposedly definitive of realism’.  
 The idea of a deflationary theory of human rights, encompassing 
constructivism and conventionalism, will be the subject of Part V, but first we need to 
consider why political conceptions of human rights should be concerned about 
providing some foundations for their human rights, and how the deflationary approach 
could help ease such concerns. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL 
 
In an effort to break away from the dominant paradigm in human rights scholarship, 
which favours a natural law approach, there has been a tendency in recent years to 
divorce human rights from metaphysical concerns, and prioritise instead a more 
pragmatic, practice-based approach. This ‘political turn’ in human rights scholarship 
invokes the appeal of public reason while allegedly not straining in the murky waters 
of metaphysics. John Rawls is, not surprisingly, the reference point for this school of 
thought, and his approach has influenced the recent works on human rights by Charles 
Beitz and Joseph Raz. This part of the paper will argue that a moderate deflationary 
approach to truth is not only compatible with the political view of human rights 
advocated by Beitz and Raz, but it can also contribute something important to it. 
 One key issue about the political view on human rights is how it positions 
itself on the question of foundationalism. On this issue there is some disagreement 
between advocates of the political view. For example, Beitz is very critical of a 
certain type of foundationalism. According to Beitz (2009, p.7), we should not think 
of human rights ‘as if they had an existence in the moral order that can be grasped 
independently of their embodiment in international doctrine and practice’; 
international human rights do not ‘express and derive their authority from some such 
deeper order of value’; the task of a theorist of international human rights should not 
be ‘to discover and describe the deeper order of values and judge the extent to which 
international doctrine conforms to it’. At the same time Beitz (2009, p.103) also says 
that a practice-based approach is not non-foundationalist: ‘One need not say, 
however, that practical views are nonfoundationalist, if by this is meant that such 
views deny that there are reasons to adhere to and support international human rights’. 
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The difference between naturalistic and agreement theories of human rights on one 
side, and Beitz’s practical conception on the other, is not that the former are 
foundationalist while the latter is nonfoundationalist; the difference instead is that 
only the former two positions seek to establish the nature of human rights: ‘The 
contrast of interest is this. Naturalistic and agreement theories treat the question of the 
authority of human rights as internal to the question of their nature…..By contrast, 
because a practical approach prescinds from taking any philosophical view about the 
nature or basis of human rights, it can distinguish between the problem of 
conceptualizing human rights and that of understanding their authority’ (Beitz 2009, 
p.103) 
 Beitz’s practical conception of human rights is not non-foundationalist, nor 
anti-foundationalist, yet it is also not foundationalist the way that naturalist and 
agreement theories of human rights are. So what is it then? According to Beitz (2009, 
p.102) the human rights enterprise is nothing more than a global practice: ‘A practical 
conception takes the doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in 
international political life as the source materials for constructing a conception of 
human rights’. This is intriguing, but not totally convincing, since we still need to 
know what justifies a practice; we need reasons that are or can be publicly endorsed 
for accepting a practice, since practice does not (and logically cannot) justify itself. 
There are good reasons why practice cannot be self-justifying. If that was the case, the 
practice of female genital mutilation would justify female genital mutilation, the 
practice of colonialism would justify colonialism, or the practice of pervasive 
corruption would justify pervasive corruption. There has to be something else, a 
foundation of some sort, that justifies the practice. Without foundations, a practice can 
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only justify the status quo, which risks making political views of human rights 
conservative. 
 Raz seems to take a much harder line, suggesting that a practice-based 
political approach to human rights can do without foundations. Raz surprised many 
readers familiar with his previous body of work in law and ethics when in 2010 he 
came out in support of Rawls’s account of human rights. In this piece Raz is highly 
critical of what he refers to as the ‘traditional doctrine’ of human rights, grounded on 
our humanity, where the only facts that are taken into consideration are laws of 
nature, the nature of humanity and that the right-holder is a human being. Raz (2010, 
pp.323-4) highlight three major problems with those theories: ‘they misconceive the 
relations between value and rights. They overreach, trying to derive rights which they 
cannot derive. And they fail either to illuminate or to criticize the existing human 
rights practice’. Alan Gewirth and James Griffin are at the receiving end of Raz’s 
sharp critique, and it is hard to disagree with much of what Raz says here.10  
According to Raz the problem with those theories is that they fail to appreciate 
the practice of human rights, since the validity of human rights is being established 
without taking into account any ‘contingent’ facts. It is precisely for this reason that 
Raz (2010, p.328) favours the political account of human rights championed by 
Rawls: ‘This is Rawls’s and my answer ….. while human rights are invoked in 
various contexts, and for a variety of purposes, the dominant trend in human rights 
practice is to take the fact that a right is a human right as a defeasibly sufficient 
ground for taking action against violators in the international arena, that is to take its 
violation as a reason for such action’.  
Raz wants to shift the discourse on human rights away from the metaphysical 
concerns about human nature in general and personhood in particular, to a more 
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political debate on the limits of state sovereignty. This is not because Raz has 
anything against the philosophical pursuits of the tradition doctrine, in fact he agrees 
with Griffin that the capacity of personhood is ethically significant, but according to 
Raz (2010, pp.327-8) this does not help us with a fundamental problem: ‘The problem 
is the absence of a convincing argument as to why human rights practice should 
conform to their theories. There is no point in criticizing current human rights practice 
on the ground that it does not fit the traditional human rights ethical doctrine. Why 
should it?’. Raz is right on this point, yet the shift from the metaphysical to the 
political has its perils, principally the fact that human rights practice lacks 
foundational justifications.  
As the politics of international human rights drifts towards becoming just the 
politics of international relations, human rights may end up without foundations, but 
that’s not something that worries Raz. In fact according to Raz this is something we 
just have to get used to. Be that as it may, and notwithstanding the title of his 
important article, he has very little to say about what it means for human rights to be 
without foundations. Raz (2010, p.336) clearly states that human rights can do 
without metaphysics: ‘[human rights] lack a foundation in not being grounded in a 
fundamental moral concern but depending on the contingencies of the current system 
of international relations’, but he fails to address the question of justification for 
human rights practice. Furthermore adhering to the contingencies of international law 
could make human rights practice very conservative, as it deprives human rights 
discourse the means to challenge the current system of international relations.  
The fact that human rights can do without the natural law approach doesn’t 
mean that it can do away with foundations; instead it only means that we need a 
different type of foundation. The practice of human rights needs some justificatory 
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base, since the justification of the practice cannot come from the practice itself 
(Beitz), nor from international law (Raz), especially since the latter has more affinity 
with bargaining-power determined justice as mutual advantage than with justice as 
impartiality. 
This is where the moderate deflationary account of truth can do some work for 
the political view of human rights. As the analysis of Griffin’s metaphysics of human 
rights in Part II shows, the natural law foundationalist approach assumes a robust 
(correspondence) theory of truth. The alternative is an alternative theory of truth, 
along deflationist lines, which would have the advantage of providing political 
theories of human rights with a justification for human rights practice which could be 
described as ‘quasi-foundationalist’. 
 
HOW TO BE DEFLATIONIST ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
This is a large thesis, and I do not propose to argue for it fully. Instead, I will 
concentrate on only one way to be deflationary about human rights. According to the 
moderate deflationary approach, human rights are artificial rights, not natural rights, 
and following Hobbes and Hume we know that what is artificial is not necessarily 
inferior to what is natural; on the contrary a natural condition or virtue can be inferior 
and less desirable than an artificial one. 
 A moderate deflationary account of human rights looks at moral 
constructivism for an alternative to the established, and in many ways still dominant, 
natural law paradigm. Constructivism is widely endorsed in moral and political 
theory. In normative ethics constructivism holds that principles within a given 
normative domain are justified because they pass some procedural test. Similarly a 
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constructivist theory of justice suggests that what comes out of a certain kind of 
situation or procedure is to count as just;11 if we can be constructivists about ethics 
and justice, we can also be constructivists about human rights.12 
 There is a tendency in contemporary political philosophy to associate 
constructivism with Kantian ethics in general, and the social contract tradition in 
particular, so much so that in the literature on human rights it is now standard practice 
to compare and contrast ‘naturalistic’ and ‘agreement’ theories’ of human rights.13 
But there is another direction in which we can take constructivism about human 
rights: not Kantian constructivism, nor agreement theories, but conventionalism. The 
moderate deflationary view of human rights has strong affinities with David Hume’s 
moral theory, in particular his views on conventionalism. 
 It should not come as a surprise that a deflationary account of Human Rights 
looks to Hume’s conventionalism for philosophical support. After all, Hume gives 
one of the most forceful and influential accounts of why there is no truth of moral 
content, or to put it differently, why moral principles have no truth value. As Russell 
Hardin (2007, p.28) explains: ‘In Hume’s view, however, true is not a term that can 
apply to moral belief. You may say it is right or wrong to do X or that it would be 
good or bad to cause Y, but those claims are only expressions of your views or 
approbations, they are not proofs of or inferences from the truth of the content of your 
views’. Hume clearly belongs in the deflationary camp. 
 Being Humean about morality doesn’t mean giving up on human rights, but it 
does require recalibrating the moral compass. Hume was disinclined to use the terms 
‘rights’, and he objected to attempts to derive rights from either intrinsic qualities of 
the person as a moral agent, or alternatively from Christian natural law.14 
Nevertheless it is possible to construct a theory of human rights, inspired by Hume, 
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characterised by a deflationary stance. According to this approach, human rights are 
institutional schemes of cooperation advantageous to the whole of society, 
furthermore human rights are artificial in the sense that they arise from human 
convention.15 
 We know that the political approach to human rights emphasizes the idea of 
human rights ‘practice’, yet as indicated above, this is unsatisfactory on at least two 
fronts. First, as pointed out in Part I, while the political approach claims to be an 
alternative to the natural-law approach, it still requires philosophical or metaphysical 
foundations, in fact something like a natural law supposition is often lurking behind 
the façade of the practice. Secondly, as emphasized in Part IV, by turning their back 
on foundationalism but at the same time failing to give a convincing account of what 
justifies a certain practice, strictly political accounts of human rights run the risk of 
being excessively conservative. On both accounts a deflationary human rights 
approach, which is both constructivist and conventionalist, can provide a solution. 
 My interpretation of conventionalism closely follows that by David Gauthier 
(1979, pp.5-6), which in turn owes much to the analysis offered by David Lewis: ‘I 
propose to regard a convention as a regularity R in the behaviour of persons P is 
situations S, such that part of the reason that most of these persons conform to R in S 
is that it is common knowledge (among P) that most persons conform to R in S and 
that most persons expect most (other) persons to conform to R in S’. 
There are two important aspects of Gauthier’s useful definition worth pointing 
out. First, the epistemological dimension: it is common knowledge that people 
conform to a regularity of behaviour. Secondly, the prudential dimension: most 
people expect most other persons to conform. On the basis of this account of 
conventionalism, a deflationary theory of human rights can be defined in the 
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following terms: Human rights are not defined by their truth, but by the generally 
recognized and accepted convention of Human Rights Practice (HPR). This practice 
produces regularity in the behaviour of persons in certain situations, such that part of 
the reason that persons conform to HRP is that it is common knowledge that most 
other persons conform to HRP in certain situations, and that most persons expect 
most other persons also to conform to HRP. 
 As with conventionality more generally, there is an element of common 
knowledge, and general expectation, when it comes to the practice of human rights. 
To the extent that there is a truth to human rights it is nothing more than the fact that 
we have reached a level of coordination, or an equilibrium point, whereby the belief 
in human right becomes common knowledge, and is generally expected to be 
acknowledged. 
 The role of conventions in this deflationary theory of human rights is crucial. 
A convention is not a one-time interaction; instead it plays out over repeated 
interactions. In other words, we are looking at an iterated coordination game. Human 
rights are an artificial social structure created by our repeated actions, or as advocates 
of the political conception of human rights would say, by our practice over time. The 
political human rights practice is crucial because it creates coordination, and 
establishes human rights as a legitimate social structure. Hume considers a whole 
range of social conventions, from traffic rules (for wagons and pedestrians) to rules of 
property, justice, war, and international relations. He does not discuss or consider 
human rights, but there is no reason why human rights should not be another set of 
rules that gains legitimacy, and brings stability, emerging from iterated practice. 
 Conventionalism can provide human rights with a quasi-foundation. The 
practice of human rights is important, as political accounts of human rights stress. In 
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fact we can even agree with Beitz that the practice of human rights is the ‘source 
material’ for constructing a conception of human rights, but we also need an account 
of the justification behind the practice. It is only when the practice becomes seen and 
acknowledged as accepted convention, through repeated praxis, that it becomes 
justified, a least temporarily.  
 The conventionalist account of human rights being put forward strongly 
resonates with Beitz’s own views. In defending his account of human rights practice 
Beitz (2009, p.104 emphasis added) says that ‘According to a practical view, 
however, to say there is a human right to X is simply shorthand for a complex 
description of regularities in behaviour and belief observed among the members of 
some group’. This idea of ‘regularities of behaviour’ plays a crucial role in both 
Beitz’s account of  human rights practice, and Gauthier’s (Hume’s) conventionalism; 
this suggests that the political approach to human rights, and the deflationist approach 
to human rights, have a great deal in common. 
 Deflating human rights is also something that Raz (2010, p.337 emphasis 
added), seems not to be adverse to, a least on the basis of what he says: ‘A right’s 
being a human right does not entail it is either basic or very important. To that degree 
this approach deflates the rhetoric of human rights’. Perhaps Raz’s own approach 
would benefit from openly endorsing a conventionalist (deflationist) approach to 
human rights. As we have seen one potential problem with Raz’s theory is that relying 
on the contingencies of the current system of international relations is far from 
reassuring, being restrictively conservative.16 Even though the deflationary, 
conventionalist approach to human rights is heavily indebted to David Hume, and 
Hume is often attacked for his conservatism, this theory of human rights is not 
conservative. On the contrary, because conventions change, and we are not tied to one 
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truth, human rights are fundamentally evolutionary, not static. The benefits of this 
theory can be seen both in places where human rights are established, but also where a 
culture of human rights is lagging behind. 
 In places where human right’s practice is established and generally accepted, 
conventionalism facilitates the advance of new human rights, since the validity and 
justification of human rights is reduced to the ability to construct a new convention, 
grounded on the belief that people conform to a regularity of behaviour.17 The 
development of LGBT rights is a case in point. There is nothing in the 1948 
declaration of human rights to suggest that Eleanor Roosevelt and the other members 
of the drafting committee of the UDHR at the time could have anticipated the recent 
development and general endorsement of LGBT rights,18 and yet through the 
continual efforts of human rights practitioners and activists over a period of time a 
new equilibrium has been secured, which endorses LGBT rights as the new accepted 
convention. The same logic applies in places where human right’s practice is not yet 
established, or where there isn’t a strong tradition or culture of human rights. Through 
the process of iterated practice, it is possible to gradually introduce new concepts such 
as LGBT rights by appealing to and extending those widely held beliefs that are 
already in place. While there is still a lot of work to be done on this front, today 
sexual rights have been recognized not only in Europe, but also in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and in Africa. 
A similar argument could be made for the human right to health. This is a 
recent development in the rapidly expanding human rights family, and more time (and 
work) is needed before this idea enjoys widespread consensus. To clarify, the human 
right to health is not a right to be healthy, which would be impossible to achieve, nor 
a right to medical care, since there is much more to health than medical care. 
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Nevertheless the idea of a human right to health, which merely highlights a standard 
threat against which everyone should be guaranteed protection, has been gaining 
traction, culminating in General Comment 14 on the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) issued in 2000. 
What is particularly interesting about the idea of the human right to health is 
the way it came into prominence. As Jonathan Wolff (2012, p.39) points out ‘The 
story of activism about the human right to health is inextricably linked with the 
HIV/AIDS crisis. This is not to say that only HIV/AIDS engages the human right to 
health – far from it – or even that every aspect of HIV/AIDS is a matter of human 
rights. But nevertheless the narrative … of HIV/AIDS brings to light human rights 
issues at every turn’. Wolff’s emphasis on activism is important here: it was the 
practice of human rights activists that not only made it possible for those affected with 
HIV/AIDS to be recognizes as victims of human rights abuse, but to broach the larger 
issues of a human right to health. 
As the examples of LGBT rights and the human right to health indicate, 
human rights practice can be very progressive. This suggests that the political view of 
human right can also be progressive. But these developments in human rights 
discourse were the result of a long process of activism that gradually established a 
new convention about our human rights. What is doing the philosophical heavy lifting 
here is not a view about the truth of human nature, but conventionalism, an idea that 
finds support in the deflationary theory of truth.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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This article wants to transcend a dichotomy that has emerged in the literature on 
human rights between two opposing camps: on one side the traditional (naturalist) 
approach, characterized by foundationalist metaphysics, and on the other side political 
conceptions of human rights, which shun any reference to metaphysics, replacing it 
with the language of ‘practice’. Both approaches have distinctive advantages, but also 
some drawbacks: while naturalistic theories appeal to ‘comprehensive’ moral 
traditions, which are sectarian in their justification, political views of human rights are 
more conservative than they want to be, being conformist to current international law 
when instead there is greater scope (and need) for being progressive, and even 
rebellious. Furthermore the suspicion remains that even political theories of human 
rights requite metaphysical foundations to justify human rights practice. 
 Perhaps there is a third way; it may be possible for political conceptions of 
human rights to have philosophical foundations (or quasi-foundations), and even 
appeal to the metaphysics of truth, just not the metaphysics of natural law theories. 
The assumption by natural law theorists that human rights are the rights we have by 
virtue of being humans is based on an underlying belief that the validity of human 
rights is an objective truth, since human rights are an essential property attached to 
human being. It is the rejection of this assumption that is the starting point for a 
deflationary theory of human rights. 
Deflationary theories of human rights are informed by deflationary theories of 
truth, which can be either extreme or moderate. When applied to human rights, 
extreme deflationism takes us to the position defended by Alistair Macintyre (1985), 
who suggests that human rights cannot be justified, that perhaps human rights don’t 
even exist, or if they exist their existence is on a par with that of witches and unicorns. 
In this article I have argued for an account of truth which is only moderately 
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deflationist. To be moderately deflationary about human rights means that when we 
use the term ‘human rights’ we are not making any postulations that there is one 
fundamental truth that justifies all human rights. Truth is not the only game in town, 
not the only meter to measure things, therefore a justification for our belief and 
commitment in human rights does not have to be dressed-up in the language of a 
universal, self-evident, incontestable truth. Our tendency to rely on truth when it is not 
required or necessary has made us intellectually lazy; the same could be said for our 
commitment to human rights.  
The practice of human rights should not be restricted by the demands of 
stability, grounded on the status quo, or by the uncritical tracking of the current 
system of international relations. By shedding the language of a universal, self-
evident, incontestable truth, we become open to the possibility of untested, unmapped 
ways to promote human rights, by constructing new conventions about human rights 
practice. The current system of international law is no longer the anchor that provides 
a valid justification for human rights. A deflationary approach to human rights, 
grounded on a conventionalist approach, gives human rights the elasticity required for 
it to become a powerfully progressive, and even transgressive, concept. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Dublin and Galway (Ireland), Rome 
and L’Aquila (Italy). I’m grateful to John Baker, Ian Carter, John Danaher, Megan 
Foster, Attracta Ingram, Gianfranco Pellegrino, my MA students at University 
College Cork who took my class on ‘Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights’, 
and especially four anonymous referees for their invaluable comments and 
suggestions. 
1 See also Freeman (1994). 
2 Clarke (1982) argues that the conservative nature and interpretation of the Irish 
constitution can be traced back to Natural Law reasoning. 
3 See also R.G.Wright (2010, p.440): ‘In the long run, metaphysics—the deeper 
“why” questions and their answers—may also be necessary to motivate the sacrifices 
sometimes called for by human rights, as human rights are commonly understood’. 
4 On the notion of self-evident truth, human rights and the Enlightenment, see 
Tunstall (2012) and Hunt (2007). 
5 On the idea of a ‘substantive property’, see Edwards (2013). 
6 It is not clear why Griffin decides to introduce the concept of truth in his analysis, 
and perhaps it wasn’t necessary to do so, nevertheless it is part of his influential text 
on human rights, so it deserves our attention. 
7 In Bufacchi (2008) I argue for a correlation between three theories of truth 
(correspondence, coherence and pragmatist) and three theories of rights (will, interest 
and pragmatist). 
8 Perhaps what makes a fact ‘natural’ for Griffin (2008, p.121) has something to do 
with what he refers to as the ‘phenomenon of convergence of beliefs between several 
persons’. Griffin recognizes that this is a complicated empirical issue, and he does not 
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provide a comprehensive account of this phenomenon. I will return to Griffin’s idea 
of convergence in Part V below.  
9 To be clear, the issue here is not that rights may not be bestowed on all individuals; 
instead the issue is whether rights are ‘properties’, or attributes. 
10 For Griffin responded to Raz’s critique, see Griffin (2010, p.350). 
11 On constructivism about justice see Brian Barry (1989; 1995) and Andrew 
Williams (2009). 
12 As Attracta Ingram (1994, p.17) points out: ‘we must be constructivists about rights 
themselves…..If rights cannot be seen as given they must be made and the job of a 
constructivist political morality is to show them in the making’. 
13 For an overview and critique of Agreement Theories of human rights, see Beitz 
(2009), Ch.4. 
14 On this issue see Haakonssen (1993).  
15 Reconciling Hume’s moral and political theory with human rights may appear to be 
counterintuitive, which in part explains why not many have attempted it, with the 
exception of Sharon Krause (2010) who offers a theory of human rights based on 
Hume’s moral sentiments theory. See also Krause (2008). I’m suggesting a different 
strategy, where human rights are grounded on Hume’s theory of convention, not 
moral sentiments. 
16 Katrin Flikschuh (2011) puts forwards a critique of Beitz along similar lines, 
suggesting that while Beitz’s characterisation of human rights reasoning as a global 
discursive practice is coherent, it lacks cogency when considered in the context of the 
post-colonial state system. 
17 The emergence of conventionalism could be interpreted in terms of what Griffin 
calls the phenomenon of convergence, although Griffin is critical of a Humean ‘taste 
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model’ of value judgment so he may not be happy to be associated with Humean 
conventionalism, furthermore conventionalism is used here merely to highlight the 
outcome of reiterated interactions.    
18 The WHO defends the position that there is a growing consensus that sexual health 
cannot be achieved and maintained without respect for, and protection of, certain 
human rights, including the rights to equality and non-discrimination, the right to be 
free from torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, the 
right to privacy, and the rights to the highest attainable standard of health (including 
sexual health) and social security. 
